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EXPLANATORY  UEUORANDUU 
A.  General  considerations 
(1)  Main  obJectives of  the  proposal 
This  proposal  for  a  Directive  has  a  dual  objective:  to  protect  the 
depositors  of  each  credit  institution  and  to  ensure  the  stabi I ity  of  the 
banking  system as  a  whole. 
Deposit-guarantee  schemes,  which  are  based  on  a  system  of  solidarity 
between  credit  institutions,  protect  depositors  in  the  event  of  a  financial 
crisis  in  an  institution  and  in  particular  those  depositors  who  have 
insufficient  financial  knowledge  to  discriminate  between  sound  and  unsound 
credit  institutions. 
But,  by  the  same  token,  guarantee  schemes  also  protect  the  banking  system 
from  the  risk  resulting  from  the  withdrawal  of  their  funds  by  depositors, 
not  only  from  an  institution  in  difficulty,  but  also  from  banks  in 
relatively sound  condition which  may  be  the  subject  of  unfounded  rumours. 
One  of  the  principles  underlying  the  establishment  of  such  guarantee 
schemes  is  therefore  that  the  costs  or  possible  distortions  caused  by 
introducing  such  schemes  are  outweighed  by  potential  economic  costs  to 
society as  a  whole  of  a  "run"  on  the  banking  system. 
(2)  Need  for  deposit-guarantee schemes 
At  the  end  of  1986,  the  Commission  was  already  convinced  of  the 
desirabi I ity  of  credit  institutions  of  all  Member  States  belonging  to  a 
deposit-guarantee  scheme  and  had  published  a  Recommendation  to  this  end, 
87/63/EEc,1  since  it  considered  that  this  instrument,  although  not 
binding,  was  sufficient  to  persuade  those  Member  States  which  did  not  have 
a  guarantee  scheme  at  the  time  to  introduce one. 
OJ  No  L 33,  4.2.1987. - 3  -
Despite  this  Recommendation,  some  Member  States  are  not  yet  convinced  of 
the  need  for  all  their  credit  institutions  to  be  required  to  belong  to  a 
deposit  guarantee  scheme,  and  two  Member  States  have  not  yet  introduced one 
at  a I I. 
It  is  certain  that  the  strengthening  of  national  and  international 
prudential  measures  is  designed  to  avoid  financial  crises  in  credit 
institutions. 
However,  in  the  same  way  as  prudential  rules,  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme  is 
an  element  in  the  safety  net  with  which  the  Commission  and  the  supervisory 
authorities are endeavouring  to surround credit  institutions  in  preparation 
for  the  extension of  their  activities which  wi  I I  start  in  1993. 
This  guarantee  meets  the  need  of  foreseeing  that,  although  it  may  be 
subJect  to  very  strict  rules  and  severe  prudential  controls,  a  credit 
institution can  experience  financial  difficulties. 
In  this  case,  the  cost  of  compensating  depositors  wil I  have  to  be  weighed 
against  that  of  reorganization  measures  which  might  be  essential  in  order 
to  rescue  the  institution. 
The  provisions  of  this  proposal  for  a  Directive  therefore  meet  a  need  and 
take  account  of  the  experience  acquired  during  the  implementation  of  the 
abovementioned  Recommendation  87/63/EEC  and  at  the  time of  recent  crises  in 
institutions  that  had  branches  in  several  Member  States.  The  proposal 
tries  to  satisfy  the  wishes  expressed  on  this  subject  by  the  European 
Pari iament  in  its  opinion1  on  the  proposal  for  a  Directive COM(88)42 
concerning  the  reorganization  and  the  winding-up of  credit  institutions and 
deposit-guarantee  schemes  and  by  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee,  in  its 
opinion of  4  July  1991.3 
Opinion of  the  European  Pari iament  at  first  reading of  13  March  1987, 
OJ  No  C 99,  13.4.1987,  p.  211. 
2  OJ  No  C 36,  8.2.1988,  p.  3. 
3  Report  of  the Chairman  1988-91,  Annex  C. - 4  -
(3)  Principle of  guarantee  by  the  scheme  of  the  credit  institution's  home 
Member  State 
Protection  is  based  on  the  principle  that  branch  depositors  wi  I I  be 
guaranteed  by  the  scheme  existing,  for  this category of  institution,  In  the 
Member  State where  the  institution has  its head  office  (home  Member  State). 
On  completion  of  the  internal  market,  all  the  activities  exercised  by  a 
credit  institution  in  the Community  through  its branches  wi  I I  be  subject  to 
a  single  accounting  system,  balance  sheet  and  profit  and  loss  account,  and 
a  system of  monitoring  solvency. 
According  to  the  opinion  of  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee,  failure  to 
respect  the  home  country  principle,  in  a  field  as  closely  I inked  to  bank 
supervision  as  deposit  guarantee  schemes,  wou I  d  have  created  a  dangerous 
precedent  for  the  realization of  the  Internal  Market  in  banking  services. 
This  wi  I I  lead  to  the  coexistence  on  the  same  territory  of  several 
deposit-guarantee  schemes.  But  the  experience  of  Member  States  in  which, 
for  many  years,  various  types  of  credit  institutions  have  been  exercising 
their  activities,  white  being  covered  by  different  guarantee  schemes, 
proves  that  this  can  work  very  well,  especially  if  the  minimum  level  of 
coverage  set  by  the  proposal  ensures  that  smal I  depositors  are  compensated 
in  at I  Member  States. 
(4)  Choice  of  minimum  level  of  coverage 
Recommendation  87/63/EEC  did  not  suggest  a  harmonized  level  of  coverage. 
Yet  it  seems  essential  in  the  run-up  to  completion of  the  single market  for 
depositors  to  be  given  basic  protection,  regardless  of  whether  their 
deposits  are  in  an  office of  a  home-country  bank  or  in  an  office of  a  bank 
based  in  another  Member  State. - 5  -
The  minimum  level  of  coverage  set  for  the  Community  should  not  be  too  high 
in  order  to  avoid  what  has  occurred  in  the  United  States  in  particular, 
where  the  risks  taken  by  individual  depositors  have  been  lowered  so  much 
that  such  depositors  have  become  virtually  indifferent  to  the  soundness  of 
their  credit  institutions. 
In  addition,  managers  of  credit  institutions  have  been  encouraged  to  hold 
risky  portfolios,  without  market  discipline  reQuiring  them  to  pay  their 
guarantee  scheme  high  premiums  because  of  the  increased  risk  of  bankruptcy 
which  such  investments  represented  for  the  institution.  In  this  way 
institutions  benefited  from  taking  risks  while  losses  were  borne  by  the 
guarantee  scheme. 
Conversely,  coverage  must  not  be  too  low  and  leave  too  many  deposits 
outside  the  minimum  threshold of  protection. 
The  only  unaggregated  data  readily  available  to  the  Commission  relate  to 
the  average  size of  deposits  held  at  Community  savings  banks. 
The  average  for  such  deposits  is  about  ECU  2  500,  which  reflects a  weighted 
average of  ECU  30  000  for  time  deposits,  ECU  2  600  for  current  accounts and 
ECU  2  150  for  savings  accounts. 
Unfortunately  averages  alone  do  not  provide  an  answer  to  the  Question  of 
what  proportion  of  deposits  or  depositors  would  have  balances  above  or 
below  any  particular minimum  level  of  protection. 
Without  direct  empirical  evidence on  the  size and  distribution of  accounts, 
it  seemed  reasonable  to try  to establish a  minimum  level  of  coverage  in  the 
Community,  based  roughly  on  the  levels of  coverage  now  chosen  by  guarantee 
schemes  in  ~ember States.  If  the  two  ~ember States  with  extreme I  y  hIgh 
levels  of  coverage  (Germany  and  Italy)  are  excluded,  together  with  those 
where  there  is  no  protection  at  all  (Greece  and  Portugal),  the  median  of 
existing  levels  is  approximately  ECU  15  000,  which  is  why  this  figure  has 
been  chosen. - 6  -
When  the  proposal  was  being  prepared,  the  question  arose  of  whether  It 
might  be  preferable  to  set  a  percentage  I imit  for  repayment  which  would  be 
more  egalitarian  but  less  protective  of  small  depositors.  This  solution 
was  not  adopted  because  it  would  have  led  to  very  maJor  changes  in  some 
solidarity  schemes  which  take  responsibi I ity  for  rescuing  the  fai I ing 
institution and  therefore  compensate  its depositors  in  ful I. 
The  compromise  solution  finally  adopted  makes  it  possible  to  limit  the 
guarantee  to  a  percentage  of  the  deposit  but  requires  that  this  covers  at 
least  90%  of  deposits,  up  to  a  payment  of  ECU  15  000.  Above  this  I imlt, 
Member  States or  schemes  remain  free  to provide  for  lower  payment  ratios or 
even  to  refuse  any  guarantee whatsoever. 
(5)  Setting  very  I imited  time  I imits  for  payment 
Most  of  the  existing  guarantee  s·chemes  provide  for  a  prompt  payout  to 
depositors,  but  until  now,  this  payout  has  very  often  been  tied  to  the 
progress  of  I iquidat ion  procedures  and  to  the  di I igence  of  I iquidators 
appointed  by  the  courts. 
This  has  often  led  to  delays  causing  depositors  very  understandable 
distress.  It  is  also  a  source  of  numerous  disputes  which  can  make  payout 
operations  even  slower. 
This  proposal  permits  a  starting  point  for  the  time-1 imit  which  is  not 
I inked  to  insolvency  procedures:  the  length  of  time  for  which  the  deposit 
is unavailable  has  been  taken  into consideration and  If  it  is more  than  ten 
consecutive  days  procedures  for  paying  out  the  guarantee  can  be  started; 
these  must  be  completed  within  a  three-month  time  limit  unless  there  are 
special  circumstances. 
This  three-month  time-1 imit  results  from  the  practical  experience  of 
managers  of  guarantee  schemes.  In  most  of  the  cases  where  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  observe  such  a  time  I imit,  a  legal  procedure  was  under  way  and 
the  valuation  of  deposits  for  the  purposes  of  the  guarantee  was  not 
distinguished  from  the  valuations necessary  for  I iquidation which  relate  to 
alI  the  assets and  are  bound  to  take  more  time. - 7  -
(6)  Depositor  information 
The  priority  goal  of  depositor  protection  suggests  that  the  depositor 
should  be  fully  informed  of  the extent of  coverage of  his  funds. 
Complete  Information  is  also  lmp.ortant  in  reducing  systemic  risk:  In 
particular,  the  greater  the  depositor's  awareness of  risk,  the greater  care 
he  wi  I I  take  to  discover  whether  the  Institution  to  which  he  entrusts  his 
deposits  is  wei 1-managed,  and  the  less  sensitive  he  wil I  be  to unjustified 
rumours. 
(7)  Questions  not  dealt  with  in  the  proposal 
Several  points  have  not  been  the  subject  of  harmonized  provisions;  the  main 
ones  are: 
(a)  the  legal  status of  guarantee  schemes 
As  already  stated  in  the  Recommendation,1  it  was  necessary  to 
acknowledge  the  coexistence  in  the  Community,  and  sometimes  in  the 
same  Member  State,  of  deposit  protection  schemes  set  up  by  private 
institutions  and  schemes  administered  on  a  statutory  basis;  most 
private  schemes  are  set  up  under  the  responsibility  of  professional 
organizations,  but  they  are  just  as  effective  as  the  schemes  managed 
by  or  with  the  assistance of  the  public authorities. 
It  was  therefore  considered  advisable  not  to  change  this  state  of 
affairs  and  not  to  compel  Member  States  and  credit  institutions  to 
adopt  a  specific statute for  their  deposit  guarantee  schemes. 
Fourth  recital  of  Recommendation  87/63/EEC. - 8  -
(b)  financing  mechanism 
there  are  also  wide  differences  in  the  financing  of  schemes.  The 
main  difference  is  whether  or  not  a  guarantee  fund  exists.  If  it 
does,  credit  institutions  pay  contributions  to  the  said  fund  at 
specific  intervals  of  time;  these  contributions  are  based  on  the 
va I ue  of  the  deposits  insured  or  on  other  parameters;  the  funds  are 
managed  by  the  guarantee  schemes  themselves. 
In  other  cases,  the  guarantee  scheme  is  funded  by  commitments  to  pay 
on  the  part  of  the  member  credit  institutions;  no  payments  are  made 
into  the  scheme  except  in  the  event  of  a  claim.  Lastly,  some  schemes 
are  mixed  (funds  plus  commitments  or  possibi I ities  of  exceptional 
contributions  in  the  event  of  a  claim). 
After  receiving  the  assurance  that  the  financing  arrangements  were 
sufficiently  sound  to pay off alI  depositors  covered,  including  those 
at  branches  in  another  Member  State,  it was  not  considered  necessary 
to  harmonize  ru I es  which  are  close I y  I inked  with  the  management  of 
the  schemes  in  Question. 
The  Question  of  whether  the  public  sector  would  be  able  to  provide 
assistance  for  guarantee  schemes  in  emergency  situations  of  exceptional 
gravity  and  when  the  schemes'  resources  have  been  exhausted,  has  been 
raised  in order  to enable  them  to  respect  their  commitments  to depositors. 
It  did  not  seem  appropriate,  in  the  proposal  for  a  Directive,  to  prohibit 
such  assistance,  which  could  prove  necessary  in  practice,  although  it  is 
not  desirable  as  a  general  rule  and  could  not  be  allowed  to  contravene  the 
rules of  the  Treaty  concerning  state aid. - 9  -
B.  Commentary  on  the Articles 
Article 1 
Article  1  gives  a  few  definitions  which  are  necessary  for  the  Directive  to 
be  understood  properly.  In  order  not  to make  this  I ist of  definitions  too 
long,  those  already  contained  in  several  Directives  have  not  been  repeated; 
these  include  "credit  institutions"  and  "branches"  which  can  be  found  in 
Directive  77/780/EEc,1  and  "home  Member  State"  or  "host  Member  State", 
which  can  be  found  in  Directive 89/646/EEc.2 
Paragraph  1 
The  idea  of  deposit  as  it  appears  in  paragraph  (1)  has  been  envisaged  from 
the  depositor's  point  of  view.  The  depositor  has  a  "credit  balance"  or 
"claim"  whereas  in  the  Directives  relating  to  annual  accounts,  this 
naturally  appears  in  the  credit  institution's  accounts  in  the  form  of 
"debt"  or  "loan".  This  terminology  has,  on  the other  hand,  been  adopted  in 
paragraph  2,  which  deals with  non-repayable  funds. 
Guaranteed  deposits  are  those  which  result  from  funds  left  in  accounts 
either  permanently  or  temporarily,  or  from  claims  for  which  negotiable 
certificates  have  been  issued. 
The  idea  of  "credit  balance"  is  relatively clear:  in  particular  it  is  used 
for  current  accounts  but  it  is  supplemented  by  the  idea  of  "funds  left  in 
accounts",  which  is  intended  to  indicate  savings  books  or  accounts  or  any 
other  instrument  in  which  funds  generally  remain  for  longer  than  In  current 
accounts. 
1  OJ  No  L  322,  17. 12. 1977. 
2  OJ  No  L  386,  30.12.1989. - 10  -
On  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  understand  the  idea  of  "claims  for  which 
negotiable  certificates  have  been  issued"  it  has  to  be  seen  in  the  context 
of  Art i c I  es  19  and  20  of  Directive 86/635/EEC1  on  annua I  accounts,  the 
first  of  which  deals with  "amounts  owed  to customers"  while  the  second  uses 
this  formula  and  spells  it  out  in  detail:  "debts  for  which  negotiable 
certificates  have  been  issued,  in  particular  deposit  receipts,  'bons  de 
ca i sse·  and  I i ab i I it i es  arising  out  of  own  acceptances  and  promissory 
notes". 
The  above  Directive  d i st i ngu i shes  these  debts  from  debt  securities  which 
appear  in  a  separate  heading.  This  distinction  is  not  retained  in  the 
definition,  but  debt  securities  may  be  excluded  from  the  guarantee  if 
Member  States  do  not  wish  to  cover  them  (option  11  of  the  Annex). 
The  definition  does  not  specify  that  deposits  have  to  be  nominative;  here 
too  an  option  is  possible  and  Member  States may  provide  for  bearer  deposits 
to  be  excluded  from  the  guarantee  (point  9  of  the  Annex). 
It  was  necessary  to define  the  idea  of  joint  account,  because of  the option 
chosen  of  a  I imit  per  depositor,  so  as  not  to  disadvantage  holders  of  such 
accounts  (Article 5(2)). 
Lastly,  the  idea  of  unavailable deposit  has  been  defined;  in  order  to speed 
up  the  payout  of  the  guaranteed  amount,  it -was  decided  not  to  link  this 
payout  with  the  uncertainties  of  the  procedures  of  reorganizing  and 
I iQuidating  the  credit  institution but  to keep  to  an  objective observation, 
namely  that  for  ten  consecutive  days  a  depositor  has  been  deprived  of  the 
funds  which  should  have  been  repaid  by  the  credit  institution. 
This  per i  od  of  ten  days  shou I  d  norma I I  y  make  it  poss i b I  e,  in  most  Member 
States,  to  obtain  a  decision  by  a  judicial  or  administrative  authority 
establishing  that  payments  have  ceased.  The  period wi  I I  be  shorter  if  such 
a  decision  results  in  the  closure  of  banks  since,  in  that  case,  the  payout 
time  I imit  (three months)  wi  I I  count  from  the  day  of  the  decision. 
1  OJ  No  L  372,  31.12.1986,  p.  8. - 11  -
Paragraph  (2) 
Some  deposits  are  exc I  uded  from  the  guarantee.  First  of  a II,  interbank 
deposits:  the  main  justification  for  this  is  that  banks  are  supposed  to 
know  the  crisis  bank's  situation  better  than  other  persons  in  a  business 
relationship with  it. 
With  regard  to  subordinated  loans,  the  existence of  the  clause  recalled  in 
the  definition  contractually  excludes  them  from  the  guarantee,  since  by 
their  nature  they  are  not  to  be  repaid  untl I  the  I iquidation  is  completed 
and  repayment  depends  on  its  results. 
Article  2 
Paragraph  (1) 
Paragraph  (1)  of  this Article contains  two  fundamental  principles: 
(a)  The  principle  that  all  authorized  institutions  must  take  part  in  a 
deposit-guarantee  scheme.  The  introduction of  at  least  one  deposit-
guarantee  scheme  in  each  Community  Member  State  had  already  been  the 
subject  of  recommendation  87/63/EEC,  mentioned  above;  not  only  does 
the  proposa I  for  a  Directive  repeat  this  requirement  (st i I I  not 
satisfied  in  two  Member  States),  but  it  makes  it  compulsory  for  all 
authorized  institutions  to  belong  to  the  schemes  set  up  in  this way. 
This  requirement  is  the  counterpart  of  the  freedom  of  estab I i shment 
of  branches  and  the  freedom  to  provide services. 
Since  credit  institutions  enjoy  these  freedoms,  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  depositors  of  branches  located  in  other  Member  States 
and  not  supervised  by  local  authorities,  and  depositors  who  entrust 
deposits  to  banks  not  established  in  the  country  where  they  reside, 
to  be  protected  against  any  risk  of  financial  crisis  in  the 
institution  in  question. - 12  -
This  wi  11'  be  an  innovation  in  several  States  where  membership  is 
optional,  even  though  most  credit  institutions  do  in  fact  take  part 
in  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme. 
(b)  The  principle  that  the· guarantee  scheme  of  the  home  Member  State 
shal I  cover  the  deposits of  branches. 
This  principle  is  the  logical  result  of  supervision  by  the 
Member  State  where  the  head  office  is  located.  Once  the  competent 
authority  of  the  home  country  is  responsible  for  issuing 
authorizations  making  it  possible · to  open  branches  .and  engage  in 
activity  with  the  freedom  to  provide  services  throughout  the 
Community,  and  supervision  of  such  activity,  in  particular  the 
monitoring  of  solvency,  take  place  at  the  head  office,  the 
implications  for  guarantee  schemes  have  to  be  recognized. 
Since  the  credit  institution  and  its  branches  are  considered  to  be  a 
single  unit,  from  both  the  legal  and  the  banking  point  of  view,  it 
seems  natural  for  this  institution  to  take  part  in  the  solidarity 
scheme  for  credit  institutions  in  the  country  where  its  head  office 
is  established.  The  I inks  between  this  institution  and  host  country 
for  its  branches  wi  I I  be  far  looser  than  they  are  now  when  branches 
are  "authorized"  in  the  same  way  as  local  institutions  and  have  to 
respect  the  requirements  of  the  Member  State  in  which  they  are 
located: 
Paragraph  (2) 
This  principle  of  belonging  to  the  home  country  scheme,  vigorously  stated 
in  paragraph  (1),  has  to  be  tempered  by  the  provision  in  paragraph  (2),  the 
purpose  of  which  is  to  enable  branch  depositors  to enjoy  the  advantages  of 
the  host  country's guarantee  scheme. - 13  -
This  is  not  strictly speaking  a  derogation  from  the  principle of  belonging 
to  the  home  country  scheme  since  the  latter  Is  stl II  required  to  guarantee 
branch  depositors  up  to  the  amount  offered  to  depositors  with  the 
institution's  head  office  but  It  is,  as  it  were,  an  additional  guarantee 
which  must  be  available whenever  branch managers  consider  it  appropriate  to 
extend  it  to  their  customers  in  order  not  to  suffer  a  competitive 
disadvantage. 
Guarantee  schemes  which  provide  a  high  level  of  protection  wi  II,  in  order 
to  enable  branches  to  belong.  have  to  find  solutions  to  problems  which  are 
different  from  those  they  have  had  to  settle  in  order  to  guarantee  the 
institutions  that  have  their  head  office on  their  territory. 
These  schemes  wi  I I  probably  have  to  avai I  themselves  of  the  disclosure  of 
information  as  mentioned  in  Article 12(5)  of  Directive 77/780/EEC,  amended 
by  Article  16  of  Directive 89/646/EEc1  in  order  to  obtain  data  which  wi  II 
be  useful  to  them  on  the  activity  and  solvency  of  the  institution  whose 
branch  wi  I I  be  applying  for  membership. 
They  wi  II  probably  have  to stipulate special  conditions  for  contributing  to 
their  guarantee  scheme  in  keeping  with  the  risks  taken,  since  part of  the 
risk  wi  I I  already  be  covered  by  the  head office guarantee. 
These  technical  difficulties  should  not  conceal  the  essential  advantage  of 
this  provision  in  preventing  distortions  of  competition  between 
institutions  and  differences  in  protection  levels,  which  depositors of  the 
same  country  would  find difficult  to accept. 
Paragraph  (3) 
s i nee  some  of  the  deposit-guarantee  schemes  which  exist  in  the  Community 
are  schemes  set  up  under  private  law  contracts,  the  fact  that  alI 
institutions  are  required  to  take  part  In  deposit  guarantee  schemes  will 
lead  to  a  constraint  not  envisaged  so  far,  but  which  should  not  create 
undue  problems.  On  the  other  hand  keeping  them  in  the  scheme  if  they  do 
not  comply  with  its  contractual  requirements,  for  example  with  regard  to 
financial  contributions or  information,  is  I iable  to prove  very difficult. 
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The  fact  that  a  guarantee  scheme  wi  I I  be  allowed  to  exclude  an  institution 
means  that  depositors  wi  I I  be  deprived  of  the  protection  to  which  they  are 
entitled  under  the  Directive  or  that  the  public  authorities  wl  11  be 
compelled  to  withdraw  authorization;  such  withdrawal  wi  I I  therefore  depend 
on  the  decision  of  a  private  body,  which  is  unacceptable  in  principle  and 
in  some  cases  unduly  severe  if  the  breach of  obi igations  Is  a  minor  one. 
As  a  way  out  of  this  dilemma,  the  proposal  for  a  Directive  accepts  the 
possibi I ity  of  exclusion  when  all  measures  to  secure  the  defaulting 
institution's  compliance  with  its  obligations  have  been  fruitless,  but 
requires  the  guarantee  to  be  maintained  for  one  year  after  exclusion, 
whatever  the  decision  taken  by  the  supervisory,authority. 
This  measure  will  enable  the  credit  institution's  supervisory  authorities 
not  to  resort  to  the  extreme  sanction  of  withdrawing  authorization  too 
automatically  and  to  find,  where  appropriate,  another  solution  for 
safeguarding  the  rights of  the  excluded  institution's depositors. 
Article  3 
This Article establishes  that  branches of  institutions that  have  their  head 
office outside  the  Community  cannot  be  compulsorily  required  to observe  the 
rule of  belonging  to  the  home  country  scheme  as  are  Community  institutions. 
As  a  result,  depositors  of  these  branches'  could  be  entirely  deprived  of 
protect ion  if  Member  States  did  not  take  the  necessary  steps  to  secure 
their  membership  of  the  local  scheme  where  they  are  not  covered  by  another 
guarantee  scheme,  for  example  in  their  home  country. 
This  is  why  paragraphs  (2)  and  (3)  of  this Article  require  the  depositors 
of  these  branches  to  be  provided  with  information;  this  is  in  fact  an 
application,  adapted  to  this  particular  case,  of  the'rules  on  providing 
depositors  with  information  which  are  contained  in  Article 6  of  the 
proposal  for  a  Directive  and  relates  to  institutions  that  have  their  head 
office  in  the  Community. - 15  -
Article  4 
This  essential  provision  of  the  Directive  specifies  the  minimum  level  of 
protection  for  depositors which  has  to  be  guaranteed within  the  Community. 
- --Paragraph  ( 1) 
Paragraph  (1)  specifies  that  the  lower  limit of  coverage  per  depositor,  for 
his  aggregate  deposits,  is  ECU  15  000,  which  is  a  I itt  le  higher  than  the 
max i mum  cover  age  provided  In  Spain  ( 11 •  700  ECU) ,  Be I g i um  and  Luxembourg 
(11.900  ECU),  Ireland  (13.200  ECU),  and  a  little  lower  than  the  coverage 
provided  in  the  Netherlands  (17.400  ECU)  and  the  United  Kingdom  (21.400 
ECU). 
This  minimum  guarantee  wi II  cover  total  deposits  of  less  than  ECU  15  000 
and  the  sum  paid  to  a  depositor  w i II  therefore  be  ECU  15  000  for  tot  a I 
deposits  of  ECU  15  000,  ECU  12  000  for  total  deposits  of  ECU  12  000, 
ECU  10  000  for  total  deposits of  ECU  10  000,  etc. 
But,  in order  to  take  account  of  the  anxieties,  in particular of  economists 
and  financial  experts  who  would  I ike  part  of  the  risks  to  be  borne  by 
depositors,  in order  to encourage  them  to  take  an  Interest  in  the  soundness 
of  the  institution to which  they  entrust  their  deposits  (even  If the  latter 
are  not  considerable),  paragraph  (4)  allows  the  minimum  coverage  to  be  set 
in  the  form  of  a  percentage  and  not  in  the  form of  a  fixed  amount. 
As  a  result,  the  ECU  15  000  minimum  wi II  not  be  paid  out  to  repay  a 
ECU  15  000  deposit  but  a  larger  deposit  - namely  ECU  16  650  - If  the 
percentage  guaranteed  is  90%  of  tot  a I  deposits.  For  tot  a I  deposIts  of 
ECU  15  000,  the  same  depositor  wil I  receive  only  ECU  13  500,  sti I I  on  the 
assumption  that  the  percentage  guaranteed  is  equal  to  90%  of  the  total; 
this  is  the  minimum  percentage  which  has  to  be  observed  within  the  I imlts 
of  minimum  coverage. --16 -
/ 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  introduction  of  a  percentage,  within  the 
I imits  specified  in  paragraph  (4),  wil I  not  have  the effect of  reducing  the 
minimum  payout  due  from  the  scheme  which  is  still  ECU  15  000;  however,  in 
order  to  arrive  at  this  amount,  in  a  scheme  where  each  depositor  is  repaid 
only  a  percentage  of  his  deposits,  it  is  clear  that  the  amount  to  be  taken 
into  account,  in  order  to  establish  the  minimum  I imit  of  deposits  to  be 
covered  for  each  depositor,'will  have  to  be  higher  than  ECU  15  000  (and, 
d~pending on  the  payout  ratio chosen,  wil I  have  to  range  from  ECU  15  000  to 
ECU  16  650). 
Paragraph  (2)  and  Annex 
Paragraph  (2)  provides  that  Member  States  may  authorize  the  exclusion  from 
the  guarantee  of  certain  depositors  or  certain  deposits  I isted  in  the 
Annex. 
These  exclusions  relate  mainly  to  the  deposits  of  financial  institutions, 
insurance  companies,  central  and  local  authorities,  and  other  depositors 
which  can  hardly  be  considered  as meriting protection because  of  their  Jack 
of  economic  expertise  or  economic  weakness.  However,  the  number  of  these 
institutions  and  persons  is  fairly  Jaige  and  the  appraisal  of  whether  it  is 
advisable  to exclude  them  varies  from  one  Member  State  to another. 
This  is  why  it  has  not  been  possible  to  achieve  fuller  harmonization  on 
this  point  because  the  arrangements  covering  these  different  institutions 
and  depositors  very  largely  depend on  the  guarantee  amount  which  the  scheme 
·provides  and  on  national  practice.  In  this  way  several  schemes  in  certain 
circumstances  take  bearer  deposits  into consideration  because  they  are  used 
by  the  smallest  savers  (non-nominative  savings  books)  whereas  most  other 
countries  wish  to exclude  them. 
The  I ist  contained  in  Annex  I  is  I imitative  and  Member  States  may  exclude 
from  the  guarantee  only  the  institutions  and  persons  mentioned  therein, 
with  any  other  exclusion  contravening  the  Directive. - 17  -
Paragraph  (3) 
Paragraph  (3)  however  permits  the  retention  or  adoption  of  provisions 
raising  the  guarantee ceiling on  which  there  Is  no  maximum  limit . 
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depositors  with  full  compensation;  these  are  the  result  of  a  solidarity 
arrangement  designed  to  avoid  member  institutions  being  put  into 
1  iquidation  and  which  therefore  provides,  in  the  event  of  closure,  for  the 
ful I  repayment  of  alI  deposits. 
Disregarding  this  extreme  case  of  the  100%  repayment  of  deposits,  schemes 
such  as  the  Danish,  French  or  I tal ian  ones,  which  under  the  guarantee  pay 
out  amounts  higher  than  the  minimum  contained  in  the  proposal  for  a 
Directive  wi  I I  be  able  to maintain  their  present  level  of  repayment.1 
Article  5 
This  Article  states  the  principle of  a  guarantee  per  depositor  and  not  per 
deposit  with  a  view  to avoiding  abuse,  as  is  the  case  in  the  United States, 
and  makes  some  provision  for  special  cases  which  have  given  rise  to 
difficulties  in  some  countries  and  have  been  solved  in  a  variety of ways. 
Paragraph  (2)  Jays  down  a  supplementary  rule  for  Joint  accounts  and 
paragraph  (3)  provides  for  the  case  of  special  accounts  where  the  account 
holder  acts  on  behalf  of  the  beneficial  owners  who  are  the  real  owners  of 
the  funds  deposited  in  the  account. 
Classic cases are  those of  property managers  who  receive  the  tenants'  rents 
before  handing  them  over  to  the  owners.  I  awyers.  who  pass  certain  sums 
intended  for  their  customers  through  their  accounts  and  trustees who  act  on 
behalf  of  their  beneficial  owners. 
Guarantee  schemes  wi  II  be  able  to  lay  down  certain  formalities  enabling 
them  to ascertain  the  identity and  rights of  depositors. 
Denmark:  31.500  ECU 
France:  57.500  ECU 
Italy:  511.000  ECU  per  deposit. - 18  -
In  some  countries  these  formalities  precede  the  provision of  the  guarantee. 
The  proposal  for  a  Directive  does  not  take  a  position  on  this  question; 
this  depends  on  _national  practice  in  relation  to  these  accounts  which  is 
far  from  being  standardized. 
Article 6 
This  Article  lays  down  the  rules  relating  to  the  necessity  to  inform 
customers  of  credit  institutions. 
Such  information  must  be  full  and  accurate  because  the  schemes  which  the 
branches  of  the  same  Member  State  wil I  join  may  be  far  more  numerous  than 
they  are  at  present.  It  is  therefore  important,  espec i a II y  if  the  branch 
depositors  do  not  enjoy  supplementary  coverage  by  the  local  scheme,  as 
provided  for  in  Article  2(2),  for  these  depositors  to  be  well  informed  of 
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  guarantee  scheme  covering  the 
institution  to which  they  entrust  their  deposit. 
Article 7 
This  Article  represents  one  of  the  main  results  to  be  achieved  by  the 
proposal,  namely  that  of  permitting  the  promptest  possible  payout  of  the 
guarantee  provided  for  by  the  scheme. 
In  order  to  achieve  this,  a  three-month  time  I imit  (renewable only once)  is 
set  for  payouts. 
This  period  wi  I I  normally  count  from  a  decision  by  the  supervisory 
authorities or  a  court  which  often  act  very  rapidly  once  the  solvency  of  a 
credit  institution  is  cal led  into question. - 19  -
However,  in  order  to  save  depositors  and  espec i  a II y  sma II  deposItors  from 
having,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  to  endure  a  delay  during  which  a 
reorganization  solution  is  sought  and  implemented  without  the  institution 
returning  to  normal  activity,  or  a  lengthy  procedure of  legal  I iquidation, 
the  proposal  provides  for  a  ten-day  period of  unavai labi I ity  at  the  end  of 
which,  if  no  decision  has  been  taken  as  to  the  institution's activity,  the 
depositor  is entitled to payment  of  the  guaranteed  amount  and  the  scheme  is 
required  to comply  with  the  three-month  time  I imit. 
Paragraphs  (2)  and  (3) 
Nevertheless,  there  is  provision  for  the  time-1 imit  to  be  extended,  but 
only  in  the  event  of  difficulties  encountered  in  the  settlement  of 
particular  cases,  e.g.  difficulties  in  proving  the  amount  of  the  deposit 
(case  of  Joint  accounts  or  accounts  where  the  account  hoI der  is  not  the 
beneficial  owner),  and  difficulties  in  identifying  the  depositor,  or  even 
in  finding  him  (if  he  has  changed  his  address  or  is  I iving  in  another 
country). 
The  very  short  time  I imits  are stipulated  in  order  to  favour  depositors  and 
should  not  operate  against  their  interests;  the  proposal  therefore  sets no 
time-1 imit  within which  they  have  to enforce  their  rights. 
Paragraph  (4)  supplements  the  provisions  relating  to  depositor  information 
contained  in  Article 6  by  information  to  be  provided  at  the  time  of  the 
claim. 
Lastly,  paragraph  (5)  states that  the  payment  shall  be  effected  in  national 
currency  or  in  ecu;  it  is  necessary  to  make  this  clear  because  the 
guarantee  is  not  confined  to  deposits  in  Community  currencies  or  in  ecu, 
but  also  covers  deposits  in  third-country  currencies,  in  keeping  with 
Article 5(1). - 20  -
Article 8 
The  first  subparagraph  of  paragraph  1  calls  upon  Member  States  to  comply 
with  the  Directive on  1  January  1994. 
The  second  subparagraph  provides  that;  where  Member  States  adopt  the 
necessary  provisions of  national  law,  the  latter are  to contain a  reference 
to  this  Directive  or  are  to  be  accompanied  by  such  reference  on  the 
occasion of  their official  publication. 
The  second  paragraph  deals  with  the  requirement  to  communicate  to  the 
Commission  the  main  provisions of  national  law  adopted  by  Member  States. 
Article 9 
This Article contains  the  usual  formula  that  this Directive  is  addressed  to 
alI  the  Member  States. - 21  -
Proposa I  for  a 
COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE 
on  deposit-guarantee  schemes 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community, 
and  in  particular  the  first  and  third sentences of Article 57(2)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  proposal  from  the Commission, 
In  cooperation  with  the  European  Pari iament, 
Having  regard  to  the  opinion of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee, 
Whereas,  in  accordance  with  the  objectives  of  the  Treaty,  the  harmonious 
development  of  the  activities  of  credit  institutions  throughout  the 
Community  should  be  promoted  through  the elimination of  any  restrictions on 
freedom  of  establishment  and  the  freedom  to  provide  services  while 
increasing  the  stabi I ity  of  the  banking  system  and  the  protection  of 
savers; 
Whereas,  at  the  same  time  as  restrictions  on  their  activities  are 
eliminated,  consideration  should  be  given  to  the  situation  which  might 
arise  if  a  credit  i nst i tut ion  that  has  branches  in  other  Member  States 
suffers  a  financial  crisis;  whereas  it  is  indispensable  to  ensure  a 
harmonized  minimum  level  of  deposit  protection  wherever  in  the  Community 
deposits  are  located;  whereas  such  deposit  protection  is  as  essential  as 
the  prudential  rules  for  the  completion of  the  single banking market; 
Whereas,  in  the  event  of  the  closure  of  an  insolvent  credit  institution, 
the  depositors of  branches situated  in  a  Member  State other  than  that  where 
the  credit  institution  has  its  head  office must  be  protected  by  a  guarantee 
scheme,  in  the  same  way  as  alI  the  institution's other  depositors; - 22  -
Whereas  the  cost  to  credit  institutions  of  participating  in  a  guarantee 
scheme  bears  no  relation  to  the  cost  that  would  result  from  a  massive 
withdrawal  of  bank  deposits  not  only  from  a  credit  institution  in 
difficulties  but  also  from  healthy  institutions  following  a  loss  of 
depositor  confidence  in  the solidity of  the  banking  system; 
Whereas  only  ten  Member  States  have  a  guarantee  scheme  in  accordance  with 
Commission  Recommendation  87/63/EEC  of  22  December  1986  concerning  the 
introduction  of  deposit-guarantee  schemes  in  the  Community1;  whereas  this 
situation  may  prove  prejudicial  to  the  proper  functioning  of  the 
Single Market; 
Whereas  the  Second  Counci I  Directive  89/646/EEc2,  as  amended  by  Directive 
92/30/EEc3  provides  for  a  system  for  authorizing  and  supervising  credit 
institutions which  wi  I I  enter  into  force  on  1  January  1993; 
Whereas  branches  wi  I I  no  longer  require  authorization  in  host 
Member  States,  because  they  wi  II  be  granted  a  single  authorization  valid 
throughout  the  Community,  and  their  solvency  wi  II  be  monitored  by  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  home  Member  State;  whereas  this  situation 
justifies  alI  branches,  set  up  in  the  Community,  of  the  same  credit 
institution  in  belonging  to  a  single guarantee  scheme;  whereas  this scheme 
can  only  be  the  one  which  exists,  for  this category  of  institution,  in  the 
state where  the  head  office  is situated,  in  particular  because  of  the  I Ink 
which  exists  between  supervision of  a  branch's  solvency  and  its membership 
of  a  deposit-guarantee  scheme; 
Whereas  harmonization  must  be  confined  to  the  elements  necessary  and 
sufficient  to  ensure,  within  a  very  short  period,  a  payment  under  the 
guarantee calculated on  the  basis of  a  harmonized  minimum  level; 
1  OJ  No  L 33,  4.2.1987,  p.  16. 
2  OJ  No  L 386,  30.12.1989,  p.  1. 
3  OJ  No  L 110,  28.4.1992,  p.  52. - 23  -
Whereas,  for  economic  reasons,  it  is  undesirable  to  introduce  throughout 
the  Community  a  very  high  level  of  protection  which  is  I iable  to  encourage 
the  reckless  management  of  institutions;  whereas,  in  addition,  In  the 
event  of  a  serious  claim,  contributions  to  the  funding  of  the  scheme  could 
become  too  burdensome  for  the  member  institutions; 
Whereas,  however,  the  harmonized  guarantee  I eve I  must  not  be  too  low  In 
order  not  to  leave  too  great  a  number  of  deposits  outside  the  minimum 
protection  thresho I d;  whereas  in  the  absence  of  statistics  on  the  amount 
and  d i str i but ion  of  deposits  in  Community  credit  i nst i tut ions,  it  seemed 
reasonable  to  take  as  a  basis  the  median  guarantee  offered  by  the  national 
systems;  whereas  that  amount  is  ECU  15  000; 
Whereas  in  the  six  Member  States  which  are  above  that  median  level,  the 
~uarantee  schemes  offer  depositors  a  coverage  of  their  deposits  which  is 
higher;  whereas  it does  not  seem  appropriate  to  require  that  these  schemes, 
certain  of  which  have  been  introduced  only  recently  pursuant  to 
Recommendation  87/63/EEC,  be  amended  on  this point; 
Whereas  the  retention  in  the  Community  of  schemes  providing  coverage  of 
deposits  which  is  higher  than  the  harmonized  minimum  may  lead  on  the  same 
territory  to  disparities  in  compensation  which  are  prejudicial  to 
depositors  and  unequa I  conditions  of  competition  between  nat iona I 
institutions  and  the  branches  of  institutions  of  other  Member  States; 
whereas,  in  order  to  counteract  these  disadvantages,  branches  shou I d  be 
authorized  to  Join  the  host  country  scheme  so  that  they  can  offer  theIr 
depositors  the  same  guarantees  as  those  offered  by  the  scheme  of  the 
country  where  they  are  located; 
Whereas,  in  order  to  speed  up  payments  under  the  guarantee,  the  initiation 
of  i nso I vency  proceedings  shou I d  not  be  awaited,  un I ess  the  I attar  take 
place  within  ten  days of  the~ deposits  becoming  unavailable  because  a  credit 
institution  finds  it  impossible  to  comply  with  the  obligation of  refunding 
them  in  accordance  with  the  legal  and  contractual  provisions  applicable  to 
them; - 24  -
Whereas  a  number  of  ~ember States  have  deposit-protection schemes  under  the 
responsibi I ity  of  professional  organizations;  whereas  other  ~ember States 
have  schemes  set  up  and  administered  on  a  statutory  basis  and  whereas  some 
schemes,  although  set  up  on  a  contractual  basis  are  partly  administered  on 
a  statutory  basis;  whereas  this  variety  of  status  poses  a  problem  only 
with  regard  to  compulsory  membership  of  and  exclusion  from  the  scheme; 
whereas  it. is  therefore  necessary  to  take  steps  to  I im it  the  powers  of 
schemes  in  this area; 
Whereas  one  of  the  objectives  of  the  harmonized  minimum  protection  laid 
down  by  the  Directive  is  to  ensure  depositor  protection  up  to  a  certain 
amount,  while  excluding  from  such  protection only  deposits  of  other  ~redit 
institutions  and  claims which  are  the  subject of  special  conditions  such  as 
subordinated  deposits;  whereas  it  shou I  d,  however,  be  poss i b I  e  for  each 
Member  State  to  I imit  such  protection  to  depositors  who  are  unable  to 
evaluate  the  financial  policy  of  the  institutions  to  which  they  entrust 
their  deposits,  by  enabling  certain  categories of  depositors  or  of  deposit 
to  be  excluded  from  the  guarantee; 
Whereas  the  principle  of  a  harmonized  minimum  I imit  per  depositor  and  not 
per  deposit  has  been  retained;  whereas  it  is  therefore  appropriate  to  take 
into  consideration  the  deposits  made  by  depositors  who  either  are  not 
mentioned  as  holders  of  the  account  or  are  not  the  sole  holders;  whereas 
the  I imit  must  therefore  be  applied  to each  identifiable depositor;  whereas 
the  same  does  not  apply  to  collective  investments  in  transferable 
securities  made  via  financial  institutions  and  subject  to  special 
protection  rules  which  do  not  exist  for  the  abovementioned  deposits; 
Whereas  in  compl  lance  with  the  Directives governing  the  admission of  credit 
institutions  having  their  head  office  in  third countries,  and  in  particular 
Article  9(1)  of  Counci I  Directive  77/780/EEc1,  as  last  amended  by 
Directive  89/646/EEC,  ~ember  States  are  to  decide  whether  and  on  what 
conditions  to  admit  the  branches  of  such  credit  institutions  to  operate  on 
their  territory;  whereas  such  branches  wi  I I  not  benefit  from  the  free 
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provision  of  services  by  virtue  of  Article  59,  second  paragraph  of  the 
Treaty,  nor  from  freedom  of  establishment  in  ~ember  States  other  than  the 
one  in  which  they  are  established;  whereas  accordingly  a  ~ember  State 
admitting  such  branches may  decide  to obi ige or  permit  such  branches  access 
to  the  guarantee  system  in  place  on  their  territory;  whereas,  however,  it 
is  appropriate  that  such  branches  should  be  reQuired  to  inform  their 
depositors of  whether  or  not  they  belong  to  any  guarantee  system  and  of  the 
extent  and  I imits of  any  such  guarantees; 
Whereas  depositor  information  is  an  essential  element  in  their  protection 
and  must  therefore  also  be  the  subject  of  a  minimum  number  of  binding 
provisions; 
Whereas  deposit  protection  is  an  essential  element  in  the  completion of  the 
Internal  ~arket  and  an  indispensable  supplement  to  the  system  of 
supervision  of  credit  institutions on  account  of  the  solidarity  it creates 
between  all  the  institutions  in  a  given  financial  market  in  the  event  of 
one  of  then  fai I ing, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECTIVE: 
Article  1 
1.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive,  the  following  definitions  shall 
apply: 
Deposit:  credit  ba I  ances  which  resu It  from  funds  I eft  in  accounts  or 
from  temporary  situations deriving  from  normal  banking  transactions  and 
which  the credit  institution must  repay  under  the  legal  and  contractual 
conditions  applicable,  and  claims  for  which  negotiable  certificates 
have  been  issued  by  a  credit  institution. - 26  -
Joint  account:  an  account  opened  in  'the  name  of  two  or  more  persons  or 
over  which  two  or  more  persons  have  rights  that  may  operate against  the 
signature of  one  or  more  of  those  persons. 
Unavailable  deposit:  a  deposit  which  a  credit  institution  experiencing 
a  financial  crisis  is  unable  to  repay  under  the  legal  and  contractual 
conditions  applicable  to  such  repayment. 
This  suspension of  payments  need  not  necessarily  be  declared or  decided 
by  a  judicial  or  administrative  authority;  it  is  sufficient  for  it 
actually  to  last  for  ten  consecutive  days. 
At  the  end  of  that  period,  the  deposit  shal I  be  deemed  to  be 
unavai I able. 
2.  The  following  shall  be  excluded  from  any  repayment  by  the  guarantee 
schemes: 
the  obi igations  towards  other  credit  institutions; 
subordinated  loans  in  respect  of  which  there  exist  binding 
agreements  whereby  such  loans  are  not  to  be  repaid  unt i I  after 
sett 1  ement  of  a I I  other  debts  in  the  event  of  the  bankruptcy  or 
1 iquidation of  the  credit  institution. 
Article  2 
1.  Each  Member  State  shal I  ensure  that  on  its  territory  one  or  more 
deposit-guarantee  schemes  are  introduced  in  which  a II  credit 
institutions  authorized  in  that  Member  State  under  Article  3  of 
Directive  77/780/EEC  must  take  part.  The  schemes  shal I  cover  the 
depositors  of  branches  set  up  by  such  institutions  in  other 
Member  States. - 27  -
2.  A branch  of  a  credit  institution authorized  in  another  Member  State may 
apply  to  join  voluntarily  the  scheme  covering  the  category  of 
institution  to  which  it  belongs  in  the  Member  State  in  which  it  is 
established  in  order  to  supplement  the  guarantee  which  its  depositors 
already  enjoy  by  virtue  of  their  obi igatory  coverage  by  the  scheme 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1. 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  objective  conditions  relating  to  the 
membership  of  these  branches  form  part  of  alI  deposit-guarantee 
schemes. 
3.  If  one  of  the  credit  institutions  required  by  paragraph  1  to  take  part 
in  the  scheme  or  one  of  the  branches  granted  voluntary membership  under 
paragraph  2  does  not  comply  with  the  obi igations  incumbent  on  It  as  a 
member  of  the  deposit-guarantee  scheme,  the  supervisory authority which 
issued  the  authorization shal I  be  notified. 
After  taking  all  the  measures  necessary  to  secure  compliance  by  the 
credit  institution,  or  branch  thereof,  with  its obligations  and  after 
noting  the  decisions  taken  by  the  supervisory  authority  (for  example 
reorganization  or  withdrawal  of  the  authorization),  the  guarantee 
scheme  may  exclude  the  credit  institution or  branch.  In  that  case,  the 
guarantee  covering  the  institution's depositors  shal I  be  maintained  for 
twelve  months  from  the  date of  exclusion. 
Article  3 
1.  Subject  to  Article  9(1)  of  Directive  77/780/EEC,  Member  States  may 
stipulate  that  the  branches  established  by  credit  institutions  with 
their  head  office  outside  the  Community  must  Join  a  deposit-guarantee 
scheme  in  operation on  their  territory. - 28  -
2.  In  any  event,  the  managers  of  foreign  branches  shall  provide  their 
depositors  with  information  enabling  them: 
either  to  identify  the  guatantee scheme  to which  the  branch belongs 
and  to  be  aware  of  the  I imits  or  cei I ings  which  exist  in  that 
scheme; 
or  to  note  the  absence of  any  such  guarantee. 
3.  The  information  referred  to  in  paragraph  2  shal I  be  made  available  In 
the  official  language(s)  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  branch  is 
established  and  shal I  be  drafted  in  a  clear  and  comprehensible  form. 
Article  4 
1.  The  deposit-guarantee  schemes  shal I  stipulate  that  the  aggregate 
deposits  of  a  given  depositor  must  be  covered  up  to  ECU  15  000  In  the 
event  of  a  financial  crisis  in  a  credit  institution  rendering  deposits 
unavai I able. 
2.  Member  States  may  provide  that  certain  depositors  or  deposit• shal I  be 
excluded  from  the  guarantee  or  shall  be  granted  a  lower  level  of 
guarantee.  The  exceptions are  I isted  in  the  Annex. 
3.  This Article  shal I  not  preclude  the  retention or  adoption  of  provisions 
which  offer  a  higher  guarantee  eel I ing. 
4.  Member  States  may  I imit  the  guarantee  provided  for  in  paragraph  1  or 
that  referred  to  in  paragraph  3  to  a  specified  percentage  of  the 
dep6sits.  However,  the  percentage  guaranteed  must  equal  or  exceed  ~0% 
of  the  aggregate  deposits  unti I  the  amount  to  be  paid  under  the 
guarantee  reaches  ECU  15  000. - 29  -
Article  5 
1.  The  I imits  referred  to  in  Article 4(1),  (3)  and  (4)  shal I  apply  to  the 
aggregate  deposits placed with  the  same  credit  institution  Irrespective 
of  the  number  of  deposits,  the  currency  and  the  location  within  the 
Community. 
2.  The  share  of  each  depositor  in  a  Joint  account  sha I I  be  taken  into 
account  in  calculating  the  I imits  provided  for  in Article 4(1),  (3)  and 
(4). 
In  the  absence  of  special  provisions,  the  account  shall  be  divided 
equally  between  the  depositors. 
3.  Where  an  account  holder  is  not  the  beneficial  owner  of  the  sums  held  In 
the  account,  it  is  the  beneficia I  owner  who  sha I I  be  covered  by  the 
guarantee.  If  there  are  several  beneficial  owners,  the  share  of  each 
owner  shall  be  taken  into  account  in  calculating  the  I imits  provided 
for  in  Article 4(1),  (3)  and  (4). 
This  provision  shall  not  apply  to  collective 
transferable securities. 
Article 6 
investments  in 
1.  Member  States  shal I  ensure  that  the  managers  of  the  credit  institution 
provide  depositors  with  the  information  necessary  for  them  to  identifY 
the  deposit-guarantee  scheme  in  which  the  institution  and  Its  branches 
take  part  within  the  Community.  The  I imi ts  or  ce IIi ngs  app II cable 
under  the  depos i t-guar  an tee  scheme  sha I I  be  indica  ted  in  a  read I I  y-
comprehensible manner. 
2.  The  information  provided  for  in  paragraph  1  shall  be  available  in  the 
official  language(s)  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  branch  is 
established  and  the  guarantee  limits  or  ceilings  and  the  level  of 
payments  shal I  be  expressed  in  ecus  and  in  national  currency. - 30  -
Article 7 
1.  Payments  und~r  the  guarantee  provided  for  in  Articles  4  and  5  shal I  be 
effected  within  three  months  of  the  date  on  which  the  deposit  becomes 
unavailable,  or  of  a  court  or  other  authority  finding  that  payment  has 
ceased  if  this  has  occurred prior  to  that  date. 
2.  For  justified reasons,  relating solely  to certain depositors or  certain 
deposits,  the  guarantee  scheme  may  request  the  supervisory  authorIty 
for  an  extension  of  the  time  I imit.  Such  extension  may  not  exceed 
three months. 
3.  The  time  I imits  referred  to  in  paragraphs  1  and  2  may  not  be  invoked  by 
the  guarantee  scheme  in  order  to deny  the  benefit  of  the  guarantee  to a 
depositor  who,  due  to  absence  or  for  any  other  Justified  reason,  has 
been  unable  to  assert  his  claim  to  a  payment  under  the  guarantee  in 
time. 
4.  The  documents  relating  to  the  conditions  and  formalities  to  be 
fulfi I led  in  order  to  benefit  from  a  payment  under  the  guarantee 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1  shall  be  drawn  up  in  detai I  in  the official 
language(s)  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  guaranteed  deposit  is 
located. 
5.  Payment  under  the  guarantee  shal I  be  effected  in  the  national  currency 
of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  guaranteed  deposit  is  located  or  in 
ecus  irrespective  of  the  currency  in  which  the  deposits  are 
denominated. - 31  -
Article 8 
1.  Member  States  shal I  bring  into  force  the  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative  provisions  necessary  to  comply  with  this  Directive  by 
1  January  1994.  They  shal I  forthwith  inform  the Commission  thereof. 
When  Member  States  adopt  these  provisions,  these  shall  contain  a 
reference  to  this  Directive  or  shall  be  accompanied  by  such  reference 
at  the  time  of  theIr  offici  a I  pub I i cat ion.  The  procedure  for  such 
reference  shal I  be  adopted  by  Member  States. 
2.  Member  States  shal I  communicate  to  the  Commission  the  text  of  the  main 
laws,  regulations  and  administrative  decisions  which  th~y adopt  in  the 
field  governed  by  this Directive. 
Article 9 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  For  the Counc i I 
The  President - 32  -
List  of  deposits  referred  to  in  Article  4(2) 
1.  Deposits  of  financial  institutions  within  the  meaning  of  Article  1(6) 
of  Directive 89/646/EEC. 
2.  Deposits of  insuranc~ companies. 
3 ..  Deposits of  the  government  and  central  administrative authorities. 
4.  Deposits of  provincial,  regional,  local  or  municipal  authorities. 
5.  Deposits  of  undertakings  for  collective  investment  in  transferable 
securities. 
6.  Deposits of  pension or  retirement  funds. 
7.  Deposits  of  directors,  managers~  members  personally  I iable,  holders  of 
at  least  5%  of  the  capital  of  the  credit  institution,  members  of  the 
external  auditing  bodies  and  depositors  with  similar  status  in 
subs i d i a r i es. · 
8.  Deposits  of  close  relatives  and  third  parties  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
depositors  referred  to at  point  7.· 
9.  Non-nominative deposits. 
10.  Deposits  for  which  the  depositor  has,  on  an  individual  basis,  obtained 
from  the  credit  institution .rates  and  financial  concessions  which  have 
helped  to aggravate  the  financial  situation of  that  credit  institution. 
11.  Debt  securities  issued  by  the  credit  institution. - 33  -
STATEMENT  OF  IMPACT  ON  COMPETITIVENESS  AND  EMPLOYMENT 
Title of  the  proposal:  Coordination of  laws,  regulations and  administrative 
provisions  relating  to deposit-guarantee schemes. 
1.  What  is  the  main  reason  for  introducing  the measure? 
The  main  reason  is  the  need  to  ensure  throughout  the Community  that,  In  the 
event  of  a  financial  crisis  in  a  credit  institution  having  its head  office 
in  the  Community,  all  depositors  receive  a  payment  of  up  to  ECU  15  000 
within  three months. 
This  minimum  protection  is  also  intended  to  prevent  massive  withdrawals of 
funds  where  rumours  emerge  (whether  or  not  justified)  about  a  bank's 
solvency. 
2.  Features of  the  businesses  concerned 
The  businesses  required  to  join a  guarantee  scheme  are credit  institutions, 
i.e.  a  category of  I icenced  businesses subject  to  prudential  supervision. 
Apart  from  the  exceptions  given  in  an  exhaustive  list,  deposit  coverage 
extends  to alI  deposits of  less  than  ECU  15  000  made  by  depositors,  whether 
natural  or  legal  persons. 
3.  What  direct  obi igations  does  this measure  impose  on  business? 
The  businesses  concerned,  i.e.  credit  institutions,  must  join  their  head 
office's  guarantee  scheme  in  order  to  cover  their  depositors  and  those  of 
their  branches  situated  in  the  Community.  They  also  have  a  duty  to  inform 
their  depositors. - 34  -
The  businesses  benefiting  from  the  deposit  guarantee  have  no  obligations 
imposed  on  them  by  the  Directive  itself. 
4.  What  indirect  obligations  are  local  authorities  likely  to  impose  on 
business? 
The  branches  of  credit  institutions  having  their  head  office  outside  the 
Community  might  be  obi iged  to  Join  the  guarantee  scheme  of  their  host 
country. 
5.  Are  there  any  special  measures  in  respect  of  SMEs?  If  so.  what  are 
..!._htl? 
There  is  no  provision  in  the  directive  that  deals  specifically  with  SMEs 
but,  to  the  extent  that  the  deposits  of  legal  persons  are  covered  in  the 
same  way  as  those  of  natural  persons,  they  wi I I  benefit  from  this extension 
of  the  guarantee  to  legal  persons  (not  provided  for  in  some  existing 
schemes). 
6.  What  is  the  I ikely effect  on: 
(a)  the  competitiveness  of  business? 
(b)  employment? 
There  should  be  no  direct  effect  on  competitiveness  or  employment.  This 
measure  comes  into  pI ay  when  the  so I vency  of  the  credit  i nst I tut ion  is 
seriously  compromised  and  its  recovery  is,  under  normal  circumstances,  no 
longer  possible. 
7.  Have  both  sides of  industry  ~~en  con~~lted?  What  are  their  views? 
The  various  European  federations  of  credit  institutions  have  been 
consulted,  as  has  EUROFIETJ  the  body  representing  the  employees  of  credit 
institutions. 
All  the  associations  concerned  are· in  favour  of  introducing  a  minimum 
payment  of  ECU  15  000  by  way  of  a  guarantee.  They  have  submitted  comments 
on  some  of  the  detailed  rules  governing  that  guarantee. ISSN 0254-1475 
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